Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans by Dionne, Georges & Rothschild, Casey G.
      
Dionne: HEC Montréal, 3000, Cote-Ste-Catherine, room 4454, Montreal, QC, Canada H3T 2A7.  
Phone: 514 340-6596; Fax: 514 340-5019; and CIRPÉE 
georges.dionne@hec.ca 
Rothschild: Wellesley College, Pendleton Hall East, Rm. 414, 106 College St., Wellesley, MA 02481.  
Phone: 781 283-3026; Fax: 781 283-2177 
crothsch@wellesley.edu 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 14-20 
 
 
 
 
Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans 
 
Georges Dionne 
Casey G. Rothschild 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Juin/June 2014 
Abstract:  
Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group 
individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and 
thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce 
informational asymmetry-induced adverse selection and improve insurance market 
efficiency. It may also have undesirable equity consequences and undermine the implicit 
insurance against reclassification risk which legislated restrictions on risk classification 
could provide. We use a canonical insurance market screening model to survey and to 
extend the risk classification literature. We provide a unified framework for analyzing the 
economic consequences of legalized vs. banned risk classification, both in static-
information environments and in environments in which additional information can be 
learned, by either side of the market, through potentially costly tests. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics such as gender, race, behavior, or the 
outcome of genetic tests to price or structure insurance policies. Risk classification helps insurers to 
group individual risks with similar expected costs, to compute the corresponding insurance premiums, 
and to reduce adverse selection (and, potentially, moral hazard). Only risk characteristics correlated 
with expected claim costs are directly useful for underwriting.1 Information on individual risk is seldom 
used to determine individual participation in employer- or government-sponsored insurance plans, but 
it is often observed in voluntary plans, where it serves to define accessibility, to classify policyholders 
into homogenous risk classes, and to set the premiums of each risk class. In health insurance, for 
example, premiums are commonly determined by age, sex, smoking behavior, parent’s health history 
information, current medical conditions (high cholesterol, diabetes, etc.), and medical histories, 
particularly of older clients; information about lifestyle, diet, and exercise, though less commonplace, is 
also used for premium setting.  
Risk classification may also take into account advances in diagnostics and treatments. These tests 
provide potentially useful and treatment-relevant information; they also raise two closely related 
concerns, particularly insofar as they reveal medical conditions that are exogenous to the individuals. 
First, there are the basic equity concerns that arise when individuals, through no fault of their own, find 
their access to affordable insurance curtailed by the outcome of such a test. Second, insofar as there is 
no well-developed market for insurance against the outcome of the test, these tests cause inefficiencies 
associated with the introduction of an additional classification risk (the risk of being re-classified and 
paying a higher premium or facing reduced access to insurance). These concerns have played a major 
role in the regulatory imposition of constraints on the use of certain types of information for insurance 
classification and pricing.2 These concerns have been a particularly important driver of regulatory 
                                                          
1
 In non-competitive environments, characteristics not directly related to expected claims loss may also be 
employed, e.g., to identify individuals with higher willingness to pay.   
2
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in the U.S. in 2010, for example, entirely prohibits 
the use of individual health status in pricing insurance. Indeed, the Act expressly forbids pricing on any 
characteristics other than age, family status, geographic or rating area, and tobacco use and even restricts the use 
of these characteristics (Baker, 2011; Harrington, 2010a, 2010b). See also Morrisey (2013) for a general overview 
of the health insurance system in the United States.  
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restrictions on the use of genetic tests in insurance pricing—and, indeed, restrictions on the 
development and use of genetic tests more generally.3 
In fact, restrictions on the use of risk classification are pervasive—and are motivated, at least in part on 
similar concerns for social equity and “classification risk” minimization. For example, gender-based risk 
classification has been prohibited in the European Union since late 2012. 
Whether based on new diagnostic tests or pre-existing information such as gender or race, concerns 
about social equity and classification risk minimization may provide a strong a priori case for limiting the 
use of risk classification in insurance markets. As we discuss extensively in this survey, however, in 
settings with market based insurance provision, risk classification is also generally associated with 
increased efficiency. 
To illustrate, observe that risk-pooling arising from legal restrictions on risk classification may lead to a 
situation in which lower-risk individuals are charged higher than actuarially fair premiums and higher-
risk individuals are charged lower than actuarially fair premiums. While these financial inequities (may) 
reduce classification risk (and/or improve social equity), the higher-than-fair premiums for lower-risk 
individuals may cause them to forgo insurance entirely, particularly when the proportion of high-risk 
individuals is large. This reduced pool of insured individuals reflects a decrease in the efficiency of the 
insurance market. These negative efficiency consequences of limits on risk classification can, in principle, 
be quite severe: exit of low risks can lead to a “death spiral” of rising premiums and lower-risk exit that 
ends up unraveling and destroying the entire market. The anticipation of such an extreme and perverse 
outcome would strongly militate against limits on risk classification. More generally, the less severe 
inefficiencies typically associated with limits on risk classification weigh against their potential benefits.  
This essay provides a unified analytical framework for systematically studying the equity-efficiency 
tradeoffs of legal risk-classification in competitive insurance markets. In Section 2 we develop a basic 
framework based on canonical adverse selection insurance markets in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
and Wilson (1977) tradition. In this framework we assume information is exogenous, in the sense that 
individuals seeking insurance are fully informed about their risk type. While we assume that insurers are 
initially uninformed about risk types, we allow for the possibility that insurers can employ potentially 
costly tests to learn some or all of the individual’s private information. Sections 3-5 analyze the equity 
                                                          
3
 See Joly et al (2010) for a global perspective on the regulation of genetic discrimination. See also Chiappori (2006) 
and Hoy and Witt (2007). 
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and efficiency consequences of restrictions on risk-classification in this general framework. Section 3 
considers a class of environments with exogenously determined contracts in which the consequences of 
restrictions on risk classification are purely distributional. Section 4 considers a related class of 
environments where such restrictions have pure, and purely negative, efficiency consequences. Section 
5 discusses endogenous-contract “screening” environments in which firms design contracts to induce 
individuals to reveal private information. Restrictions on risk classification in these environments 
typically involve tradeoffs between distributional and efficiency goals. Sections 6 and 7 extend our 
analysis to environments where risk classification is related to the endogenous choices of (potentially) 
insured individuals: section 6 studies environments where individuals endogenously acquire information 
about their own risk type, and section 7 studies environments where risk-classification is based on the 
endogenously chosen actions of the insured individuals. Section 8 discusses work at the frontiers of 
insurance market theory, and its implications for the analysis of risk classification, and suggests 
important directions for future research. We offer some brief conclusions in section 9.  
2. The Canonical Modeling Framework 
 
We base our analysis on the standard adverse selection model of insurance markets introduced in the 
economics literature by Arrow (1963) and developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson 
(1977). Individuals are endowed with a lump sum of money  and face a risk of a monetary loss of size 
   There is a set   of distinct types of individuals, indexed by  , who differ only in their probability    of 
experiencing the loss. For much of the analysis we focus on the case with two types, called (igh Risk) 
and  (ow risk), and we assume that       and that there is a fraction   of -types. More generally, 
we denote by      the population fraction of  -types  
Insurance contracts are offered by risk neutral insurers. Contracts consist of a premium  , paid by the 
insured in both the loss and no-loss states, and an indemnity  which is paid to the insured in the loss 
state.  An individual who purchases such a contract thus has net wealth       available for 
consumption if she does not experience a loss and           if she does experience a loss. 
We henceforth describe contracts directly in terms of the induced consumption allocations        .  
Insurers are risk-neutral and, since        and           , they earn profit 
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  (       
 )          
            (1)  
from selling a contract         to an  -type.  
Individuals choose (at most) a single contract to maximize their expected utility,  
  (       
 )  (    )       
        (2)  
where         and            
2.1 Informational environments 
We consider both symmetric and asymmetric informational environments. With symmetric information, 
we can assume without loss of generality that firms and individuals observe the true type of each 
potential customer.4   
The asymmetric information environments we focus on are those in which insurers are less informed 
than individuals about their risk type. (See Villeneuve, 2005, for an analysis of markets in which the 
insurer is more informed than the insured.) Then we can assume, without loss of generality, that 
individuals are fully informed about their true risk type.5  
Completely uninformed insurers know only the population distribution     ; all individuals are 
indistinguishable to them. We model partially informed insurers as in Hoy (1982) and Crocker and Snow 
(1986): partially informed insurers observe an informative “signal”     about each individual’s risk type. 
The signal is informative insofar as the signal-conditional probability distributions    |   differ from 
      Signals are also referred to in the literature as “groups”, “categories”, or “classes”.   
When there are two risk types,  and  , and two groups,        —e.g. males and females—we take 
   |      and    |         so that there is a higher fraction of low-risk types in group  ; 
when     , however, group   nevertheless contains some high-risk individuals as well; similarly, 
group   has relatively more high-risk types but may contain low risks as well. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 A model with symmetrically known but uncertain risks    is isomorphic to one with symmetrically known and 
certain risks  ̃       . 
5
 We relax this in section 6 where we consider endogenous information acquisition.  
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2.2 Market outcomes 
We refer to the consumption allocations {(  
    
 )}
   
 obtained by the various risk types in a given 
market environment as a “market outcome”. These are frequently (but not exclusively) referred to as 
“equilibrium” outcomes in the literature, and we occasionally use that terminology here as well, but the 
literature is somewhat inconsistent in the formal underpinnings of various equilibrium concepts (see 
Hellwig, 1987, for a discussion).  
The market outcome that obtains in a given market environment naturally depends on the informational 
and the institutional features of that environment. We focus on two types of institutions, both of which 
are competitive and both of which involve exclusive contracting. We refer to these two types as the 
fixed contracts and screening cases.  
In the fixed contracts case, firms compete on premium to provide an exogenously fixed indemnity . 
We focus, in particular, on the full insurance case where   , although the analysis could be readily 
extended to a setting with    as well.  This is a useful stylized model for examining settings in 
which, by law or by custom, insurance contracts are standardized. We assume that the market 
outcomes in this case are given by the lowest-price Nash equilibrium of a game in which (a large number 
of) firms first set contract prices—potentially depending on the signal  —and individuals then choose 
the lowest priced contract available to them.  
In the screening case, firms compete on two dimensions: the price per unit of coverage     and on the 
level of coverage . This additional flexibility allows firms to offer menus of contracts designed to 
differentially appeal to different risk types. A single firm might, for example, offer both a high-deductible 
low-premium contract and a low-deductible high-premium contract in the hopes of inducing individuals 
to reveal their risk type via their contract choices. Such a screening strategy is potentially useful when 
firms cannot observe risk type or else face regulatory restrictions on offering type-specific contracts.  
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Figure 1: RS and MWS Market Outcomes 
 
The canonical market outcome in the screening case is the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium, which 
is depicted by the pair of points  ⃗  
  and  ⃗  
  in Figure 1 for a market with two risk types (and 
unobservable private information). This market outcome allocates the individually break-even, full 
insurance contract  ⃗  
  to the -types and, to the  -types, the individually break-even contract  ⃗  
  that 
lies on the -type’s indifference curve through  ⃗  
  . This indifference curve is the dashed labeled     in 
Figure 1.6  
The Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium is the only possible Nash equilibrium of a game in which 
multiple firms simultaneously offer individual contracts and then individuals choose their preferred 
contract from the set of contracts offered. Unfortunately, this allocation is actually a Nash equilibrium 
only when the fraction   of high risk types is sufficiently high.7 Moreover, as Hendren (2014) 
demonstrates, the lack of existence of a non-trivial Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is, in fact, a generic 
property of models with sufficiently rich type spaces. This makes the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium 
concept ill-suited to general analyses of market outcomes in insurance markets.  
                                                          
6
 Throughout the paper, we use     to label  -type indifference curves, but it is  worth noting that the underlying 
allocations are, in some cases, diagram-specific. 
7
 Insurers have an incentive to deviate to a pooling contract that attracts both risk types when   is low, but no 
pooling contract can be a Nash equilibrium (viz Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).   
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The literature has employed several distinct alternative equilibrium concepts to resolve this non-
existence problem, each of which predicts a unique equilibrium outcome for any set of parameters.  The 
Riley (1979) “reactive” equilibrium coincides with the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium candidate—
regardless of the type distribution  . The Wilson (1977) E2 “foresight” equilibrium coincides with the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium whenever the latter exists, and otherwise is a pooling equilibrium in 
which both risk types receive the  -type’s most preferred pooled zero-profit contract.  
The so-called Miyazaki (1977)-Wilson (1977)-Spence (1978) (henceforth, MWS) equilibrium rests on a 
similar “foresight” concept, but allows subsidies across contracts.8 The contract pair  ⃗   
  and  ⃗   
  in 
Figure 1 qualitatively depicts a cross-subsidizing MWS market outcome in the two-type private 
information setting. In this market outcome, -types get full insurance at better than actuarially fair 
rates.  -types’ contract  ⃗   
  leaves them underinsured, but less so than with the Rothschild-Stiglitz 
candidate  ⃗  
   The additional insurance is valuable enough to  -types that they prefer  ⃗   
  to  ⃗  
  in 
spite of its lower actuarial value—so the cross subsidies implicit in the MWS pair are Pareto improving. 
In the MWS market outcome, the market takes advantage of these Pareto-improving cross subsidies 
whenever they exist. Specifically, in the two-type model the MWS outcome is the member of the class 
of constrained efficient separating allocations which maximizes the expected utility of  -types subject to 
 -types being at least as well off as they would be with their full insurance actuarially fair contract.9  
An alternative approach to modeling market outcomes in the insurance literature is to focus on efficient 
allocations (see, e.g., Crocker and Snow, 2013) rather than market equilibrium outcomes per se.  
With symmetric information, a “first best efficient” allocation is one that maximizes the well-being 
    ⃗      of (e.g.) the  -type subject to resource feasibility, 
 ∑       ⃗     
   
    (3)  
and a set of minimum utility constraints, 
                                                          
8
 See Netzer and Scheuer (2013), Mimra and Wambach (2011), and Picard (2014) for recent game theoretic 
foundations of the MWS equilibrium. See Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Martin (2007) for discussions of the 
microfoundations of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Riley equilibrium.  
9
 With   types, the MWS equilibrium can be defined recursively as the allocation which maximizes the utility of the 
lowest risk type subject to minimum utility constraints for higher risk types   which correspond to the utility   
would achieve in an MWS equilibrium for a market consisting only of the types   and riskier; see Spence (1978).  
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  ( ⃗    )   ̅      (4)  
for all other risk-types     with     . Every point on the first best frontier is the solution to this 
mathematical program for an appropriate choice of the  ̅  in (4).10 An allocation is on the first best 
efficient frontier if and only if (i) there are zero aggregate profits and (ii) each type receives full 
insurance (i.e.,   
    
  for all  ). A social planner who observes every individual’s risk type and can 
directly assign allocations based on this information can, in principle, implement any allocation on the 
first-best efficient frontier.   
When individuals are privately informed about risk type and the social planner is completely uninformed 
about an individual’s risk type, however, a “second-best” efficiency problem for the social planner is 
appropriate. In this second-best (or “constrained”) efficient problem, the social planner faces the 
additional incentive compatibility constraints: 
  ( ⃗    )   ( ⃗    )          (5)  
These constraints reflect the fact that insofar the social planner cannot directly identify an individual’s 
type, and thus cannot force an individual to select a contract which she finds strictly worse than some 
other contract which is available to another individual who is indistinguishable from them.11  
When the social planner is partially informed about individual risk types via a signal  , it can condition 
contracts on the signal, so the incentive compatibility constraints for the constrained efficient problem 
are instead:  
  ( ⃗     )   ( ⃗     )                      |        |        (6)  
 
Our approach to studying the effects of risk classification on market outcomes will be to compare 
market outcomes in the presence of risk classification to market outcomes in its absence. Our general, 
but not exclusive, focus is on the MWS outcomes.  
We do not consider some other models of market outcomes discussed in the literature. For example, we 
do not explicitly consider models with a monopoly insurance provider (e.g., Stiglitz, 1977 and Chade and 
                                                          
10
 This is just a definition of Pareto efficiency. As such, these minimum utility constraints should not be interpreted 
as participation constraints—they may be lower, e.g., than              .  
11
 Of course, the social planner could always choose to offer a single contract to all individuals, in which case 
constraint (5) would have no “bite.” 
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Schlee, 2012) or oligopolistic markets (e.g., Buzzacchi and Valletti, 2005). Nor do we consider linear 
pricing equilibrium, which are often used in markets where contracting is non-exclusive and individuals 
can buy small amounts of coverage from multiple providers simultaneously (e.g., Pauly, 1974, Hoy and 
Polbgorn, 2000, Villeneuve, 2003, and Rothschild, 2014). 
3. Risk Classification with Purely Distributional Consequences 
 
Policy discussions about risk classification frequently emphasize the perceived distributional benefits of 
restricting firms from employing risk classification and downplay or ignore the potential efficiency costs 
of such restrictions. We first consider a (rather restrictive) setting in which risk-classification does not 
have any efficiency consequences and this emphasis is appropriate.  
This setting is characterized by the following assumptions:  
(i) there are two risk types,  and  , with      , and a fraction   of -types; 
(ii) there is symmetric information: insurers and individuals can both observe type; 
(iii) insurance contracts are fixed full insurance contracts—so firms compete only on price; 
(iv) there is a mandatory purchase requirement: each individual must buy exactly one contract.  
Figure 2 depicts the Nash equilibrium market outcomes.12 When insurance providers classify based on 
observable risk type, each type         pays its type-fair premium        in exchange for full 
indemnification    of the loss  The associated consumption allocations are labeled  ⃗  ,      . 
When insurance providers do not employ risk classification based on risk type, both types of individuals 
pay the pooled-fair premium  ̅                  ̅ , which yields consumption  ⃗  .  
These are the unique Nash equilibria of the pricing games that arise, respectively, with legal and with 
banned risk classification. In particular, risk classification will be used by the market if it is permitted 
since (e.g.), at the no classification equilibrium  ⃗    a deviating firm could make positive profits offering 
a slightly less expensive contract (just up and to the right from  ⃗  ) which is available only to  -types. 
This will attract all  -types, leaving only the -types buying  ⃗   and rendering that contract 
unprofitable. As such, the no-classification market outcome is likely to arise only when there are explicit 
                                                          
12
 Note that we can use Nash equilibrium in this game, since firms compete only on price. When firms also 
compete on product design, we will focus on the MWS equilibrium concept.  
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legal restrictions on the use of risk classification—and only then in the absence of other regulatory 
interventions (e.g., risk-adjustment schemes) that mitigate firms’ private incentives to “cream skim” the 
low risk types. 
 
Figure 2: Purely Redistributive Risk Classification 
Since the market outcomes both with and without risk classification are first-best efficient, banning risk 
classification has purely distributional consequences in this setting: it improves the well-being of the 
relatively worse-off -types at the expense of the relatively well-off  -types without causing any 
inefficiency. With typical distributional preferences, bans on risk classification are therefore welfare 
improving in this institutional setting.  
To elaborate on this point, it is useful to consider an alternative interpretation of Figure 2 and the 
preceding argument. Suppose that risk classification is permitted, but individuals are all identical and are 
originally uninformed about their risk types; consequently, all buy insurance at the pooled fair price and 
consume at the point  ⃗    Now suppose a new test is developed that will perfectly reveal their type—
either  or  . If individuals who take the test will be offered insurance at their type-fair price, then 
individuals, being risk averse, will choose not to take the test: taking the test has no effect on their (full) 
coverage, but introduces “premium risk” that reduces their expected utility insofar as they are risk 
averse. Requiring everyone to take such a test would be efficiency reducing.13 
                                                          
13
 This omits the possibility that tests convey treatment-relevant information—in which case undertesting due to 
premium risk can cause additional inefficiencies. Section 6 discusses endogenous informational environments in 
more detail.  
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Turning this around, if types are instead known, at the time of insurance contracting, then type is itself a 
risk from an ex-ante point of view before types are realized. From this ex-ante point of view, then, the 
premium risk associated with the realization of type is itself inefficient. So a ban on risk classification 
that has the effect of eliminating premium risk is efficiency enhancing from an ex-ante point of view.   
The assumptions (i)-(iv) underlying the analysis in this section are obviously quite restrictive, but 
assumptions (i) and (ii) are easily relaxed:  the same basic result would hold if there were more risk 
types, or if insurers could observe an imperfect signal of individuals’ privately known risk type. On the 
other hand, as we discuss in the following section, if contracts are not regulated to provide fixed, full 
coverage per (iii) and there is no individual purchase requirement, there will typically be negative 
efficiency consequences of imposing legal restrictions on risk classification in screening settings.  
The mandatory purchase assumption (iv) may or may not be essential, depending on specifics of 
individual preferences and on the distribution of risk types. In the situation depicted in Figure 2, (iv) is 
not essential since the pooled-fair full insurance point  ⃗   lies strictly above the “autarkic” indifference 
curve     that passes through the no-insurance consumption point        .This means that, if risk 
classification were banned, both individuals would voluntarily choose  ⃗   rather than forego insurance. 
Assumption (iv) is critical, on the other hand, if  -types prefer foregoing insurance to  ⃗  .  
4.  Risk Classification with Pure Efficiency Consequences 
 
The assumptions in Section 3 restrict the behavior of firms and individuals sufficiently to ensure that the 
only effect a risk-classification ban will have is a change in the prices paid by different individuals. 
Indeed, under these assumptions, a ban on risk classification will result in universal insurance at a 
pooled fair price. A ban on risk classification in the presence of other strict regulations, namely a 
purchase mandate and strong minimum coverage requirement is, therefore, not only unproblematic, 
but, in fact, yields an outcome—universal full insurance against risk and full insurance against 
classification risk—that is particularly normatively compelling.  
This section shows that the welfare effects of risk classification bans can be quite different in the 
absence of other strict regulations.  
12 
 
When the mandated purchase assumption (iv) is relaxed, for example, a ban on risk-classification can 
reduce efficiency without any beneficial distributional consequences at all. To wit: when the fraction   
of high-risk types is sufficiently high the pooled fair full insurance contract  ⃗   lies close to  ⃗   and 
 ( ⃗     )             ; under a ban, then, any premium at which  -types will buy insurance 
will be strictly unprofitable when it is also sold to -types. Bans therefore lead  -types to exit the 
insurance market and make them strictly worse off than they would be in the absence of a ban, without 
improving the lot of the -types, who end the exact same contract  ⃗   as they obtain in a risk-
classifying regime.14 
The negative efficiency consequences of a ban on risk-classification in a fixed, full insurance contract, 
voluntary-purchase environment can be quite dire. Suppose, for example, that there is a continuum of 
risk types with risk probabilities    uniformly distributed on        For any given premium    , only 
individuals with  
 
        
           
           
 (7)  
will voluntarily purchase insurance. The break-even premium for this buyer pool is            . 
When               for all      (e.g., with            and      , which implies 
      and hence        ), then there is no premium     at which firms are willing to sell 
contracts. The market completely unravels via an “adverse selection death spiral”15 and no insurance at 
all is provided.  
As we discuss in the next section, without fixed full insurance contracts (i.e., when firms can freely 
choose coverage levels), firms may be able to use screening mechanisms to prevent a complete collapse 
                                                          
14
 The Affordable Care Act contains a purchase mandate precisely to prevent this sort of exit-based unraveling, 
although Feldstein (2013) argues that the fine for violating the mandate is insufficient to prevent exit. See also 
Handel et al (2013), who use a quantitative equilibrium model to predict both the degree of unraveling through 
non-compliance with the mandate, per Feldstein, and to predict the degree of “unravelling” to pooling lower-
coverage “bronze” plans. 
15
 See, e.g., Akerlof (1970), Cutler and Reber (1998) and Strohmenger and Wambach (2000). 
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of the market for insurance,16 but even in this case, risk classification bans can still be purely efficiency 
reducing.17  
5. Risk Classification with Efficiency/Redistribution Trade-Offs 
 
Risk classification in screening environments will frequently involve a non-trivial tradeoff between the 
efficiency and distributional equity consequences. In this section, we use the MWS market outcomes to 
illustrate this tradeoff.18 We then discuss various approaches to the welfare analysis of risk classification 
bans in the presence of these tradeoffs. 
5.1 Efficiency and distributional effects with MWS market outcomes 
Figure 1 can be used to analyze the two-type, symmetric information case. With risk classification, 
individuals would receive full insurance at their actuarially fair full insurance premium, resulting in the 
allocation  ⃗   for  -types and  ⃗  
  for -types. When risk-classification is banned, the market 
implements the MWS contracts  ⃗   
 . Since, as drawn, this market outcome involves cross-subsidies 
from the  -types to the -types, -types are strictly better off with banned risk-classification while  -
types are strictly worse off (but better off than with the Rothschild-Stiglitz candidate  ⃗  
 .) For a social 
planner who would like to redistribute from  -types to -types, banning risk classification thus has 
desirable distributional consequences.  
The ban, however, also has unambiguously negative efficiency consequences: it moves the economy 
from a first-best efficient allocation to one which is not first best efficient. Specifically, it is inefficient 
because replacing the  -type’s allocation  ⃗   
  with the full insurance  ⃗   depicted in Figure 1 is 
information- and resource-feasible and strictly improves the welfare of  -types. Moreover, by imposing 
a properly calibrated tax/subsidy on contracts sold to     types, a social planner could induce a 
decentralized market to implement the allocation ( ⃗   
   ⃗  )  So, while a social planner could, on 
                                                          
16
 Hendren (2014, Theorem 1) provides a precise characterization of the condition under which screening 
mechanisms (broadly interpreted) can and cannot prevent a death spiral.  
17
 Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) look empirically at the consequences of community rating (a ban on risk 
classification) in the small group and individual health insurance market in New York State. They provide evidence 
consistent with this sort of an effect: they find no evidence of a significant reduction in the fraction of individuals 
with insurance, but they do find evidence of a significant shift towards less generous insurance coverage. 
18
 See Hoy (2006) for a related analysis using the Wilson (E2) equilibrium concept.  
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distributional grounds, reasonably prefer a straight ban on risk classification to the pure free market 
outcome with legal risk classification, any welfarist social planner would strictly prefer a regime with 
legal risk classification and such a tax/subsidy scheme.  
Crocker and Snow (1986) show that the same conclusions apply when risk classification is only partially 
informative. They consider the setting with two risk types and two partially informative signals   and  , 
such that    |                   |  , with      and      (i.e., signal   indicates 
that an individual is assigned to the category with a higher fraction of high-risk types, and signal   
indicates the category with more low-risk types). To illustrate their (more general) result, consider the 
MWS market outcomes. Without risk classification, the outcome ( ⃗   
   ⃗   
 ) is a standard two-type 
MWS equilibrium for an economy with a fraction   of high-risks. With risk classification, the market 
outcome provides individuals in group   (         with the consumptions ( ⃗   
    ⃗   
  ) associated 
with the MWS outcome for a two risk-type economy with the group-specific fractions    of high-risks. 
There are three possibilities: 
(1) The  -group market outcomes ( ⃗    ⃗  ) do not involve cross subsidies from low to high risks.  
(2) The  -group market outcomes ( ⃗    ⃗  ) involve cross subsidies and the no risk-classification 
market outcomes ( ⃗   ⃗ ) do not involve cross subsidies.  
(3) The no risk-classification market outcomes ( ⃗    ⃗  ) involve cross subsidies.   
These three possibilities are exhaustive because (fixing preferences and other parameters in the 
standard two-type setting) there exists a cutoff  ̂        such that the MWS market outcomes involve 
cross subsidies if and only if    ̂ (viz Crocker and Snow 1985a). We use this fact extensively below. We 
also use the fact that the well-being of each type is decreasing in   for    ̂  Intuitively: a higher 
fraction of  -types means more scope for Pareto-improving cross subsidies.  
In case (1),  ̂         , and market outcomes coincide with the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium 
consumptions both with and without risk classification. In this case, banning risk classification has 
neither efficiency nor distributional consequences—indeed, it has no economic effects at all. 
In case (2),     ̂       and the market outcome with risk classification Pareto dominates the 
market outcome without risk classification: Category   individuals receive the same Rothschild-Stiglitz 
separating contracts with and without risk classification, while the Category   individuals take 
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advantage of Pareto-improving (within category) cross-subsidies and are strictly better off with risk 
classification. In this case, risk classification has only (beneficial) efficiency consequences.   
 
Figure 3: Risk Classification Can Have Both Efficiency and Distributional Consequences 
In case (3),       ̂  Figure 3 illustrates the special case with      and     ̂. Triangles denote 
the category-  and type-  contracts  ⃗   
   that obtain when risk classification is legal, and circles denote 
the type-  contracts  ⃗   
  that obtain when classification is banned. As shown in the figure, risk 
classification has distributional consequences. Relative to a ban, risk classification makes category-  
individuals (all of whom are  -types since      here) strictly better off: it moves them to the higher 
dashed indifference curve. It also makes both types of category-  individuals worse off, moving them 
onto the lower dashed indifference curves.  
Risk classification bans also have efficiency consequences in this case. To see this (again for the special 
case illustrated in Figure 3) note that category is observable and that category   is perfectly indicative of 
type    So, starting from the banned-classification market outcome, it is informationally feasible, and 
less costly (profit increasing), to move the   category individuals from  ⃗   
  to the allocation  ⃗   
   
depicted in Figure 3. Hence, the no risk classification outcome is not second-best efficient. The second 
best inefficiency of the no risk classification outcome extends to the more general case where      
(and arbitrary      .
19  
                                                          
19 To wit: the no classification outcome involves cross subsidies (as    ̂). The magnitude of these cross subsidies 
is effectively chosen to balance the subsidy’s incentive constraint-easing benefits to  -types with the cost, to  -
types, of transferring resources to  -types. Lowering the fraction of  -types lowers the resource cost of any given 
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5.2 Welfare analysis with distributional and efficiency effects 
There are three broad approaches to welfare analysis when there are both efficiency and distributional 
consequences (as in case (3) above). One approach is to adopt an explicit social welfare function or 
family of social welfare functions which assign welfare weights to the different types. This approach can 
be viewed as imposing a well-specified trade-off between the distributional benefits and the efficiency 
costs. Hoy (2006), for example, uses an explicit utilitarian social welfare function (and his results would 
obviously extend to a broad class of social welfare functions), and Einav and Finkelstein (2011) use a 
deadweight-loss based formulation that is equivalent to a utilitarian social welfare function with the 
particular cardinalization of individual utilities that weighs willingness-to-pay equally across individuals.20  
A second approach is to explicitly and separately quantify the efficiency and distributional 
consequences; this approach is useful when different policy analysts differ in their perception about the 
optimal trade-off between distribution and efficiency concerns. See, e.g., Finkelstein et al. (2009) who 
apply this approach to the analysis of gender classification in the U.K. compulsory annuity market).   
A third approach is to argue that policymakers should focus exclusively on the efficiency consequences. 
Of course, in the simple models considered in this paper, one way to achieve full efficiency is to 
implement mandatory full insurance at a pooled price for all individuals—either through strict 
regulations or via direct government provision. But for a policymaker who is committed to market 
solutions, there are settings in which restricting attention to the efficiency consequences of risk 
classification is fruitful, even if that policymaker cares about equity as well as efficiency. Consider, for 
example, the constraint inefficient market outcome ( ⃗   
   ⃗   
 ) which obtains under a ban on risk 
classification, as depicted in Figure 3. Under certain distributional preferences, this market outcome 
could be preferred to the market outcome that obtains with legalized risk classification. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
amount of incentive constraint easing, and thus tilts the balance towards additional cross subsidies. This means 
that at ( ⃗   
   ⃗   
 ) in Figure 3, additional cross subsidies would be Pareto improving within category   even 
when     . There is therefore an alternative allocation that could be offered in an incentive-compatible way to 
the category   individuals that would increase the well-being of both category-  types at the same net actuarial 
cost for the category. It is therefore information- and resource-feasible to make the category   individuals strictly 
better off without changing the allocations to category-  individuals.  
20
 See also Thomas (2008), who invokes a “loss coverage maximization” criterion. In contrast to the tradeoffs 
between the ex-ante expected utility levels of different individuals that is invoked by a weighted-average-of-
expected-utility social welfare function, loss coverage maximization invokes an explicit tradeoff between ex-
ante coverage levels across high and low risk types. Specifically, the criterion assigns equal weight to equal 
expected losses.  
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the fact that ( ⃗   
   ⃗   
 ) is (constrained) inefficient means that there is some Pareto improving 
alternative that a social planner facing the same informational constraints as the market could 
implement. Crocker and Snow (1986) (building on their earlier work (1985b)) show, moreover, that 
these Pareto improvements can be decentralized via a set of contract (and category) specific taxes, at 
least when it is costless for firms to observe the categorical signals  .  
Rothschild (2011) extends Crocker and Snow’s (1986) argument by showing that the provision of partial 
social insurance is an alternative way to decentralize Pareto improvements associated with a shift from 
a banned classification to a legalized classification regime. His argument boils down to a simple 
observation: removing bans on risk classification is potentially problematic only insofar as it “undoes” 
the cross-subsidies provided by the market to individuals in the higher risk category. Coupling a removal 
of ban with another policy to “lock in” this cross subsidy moots these concerns. Rothschild (2011) shows 
that a simple-to-implement partial social insurance scheme can accomplish this “lock in”.  
Figure 4 illustrates the argument.  The pair   ⃗   
   ⃗   
   depicts the MWS outcome with banned 
categorization; as illustrated, the market involves cross subsidies from  -risks to -risks, so the market 
outcome falls under case (3), and, as described above, risk classification has both distributional and 
efficiency consequences. 
 
Figure 4: Partial Social Insurance is Preferable to a Ban on Risk Classification 
Now suppose the government implements a social insurance policy providing the indemnity of  and 
the (mandatory) premium    depicted in Figure 4. This policy is the pooled-fair partial social insurance 
policy that yields the same  -type to -type resource transfer as the contract pair   ⃗   
   ⃗   
  . With 
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this social insurance in place, individuals have an effective wealth of ̃       and face an effective 
loss of ̃      , and there is still scope for supplemental private insurance. In fact, the provision of 
this partial social insurance does not affect the allocations  ⃗   
  provided under a risk classification ban 
at all: the MWS market outcome with endowment wealth ̃  and loss ̃ remains ( ⃗   
   ⃗   
 ). But 
now these same outcomes are implemented with zero private market cross subsidies from  -risks to -
risks. Indeed, with endowment wealth ̃  and loss ̃, the population fraction   of high risks is exactly the 
“cutoff” fraction  ̃̂ between an MWS equilibrium with and without no cross subsidies. Hence, with the 
social insurance policy in place, the MWS equilibrium falls into case (2) and, as described above, 
introducing risk classification is purely efficiency improving in case (2).21   
In an otherwise unregulated setting, Crocker and Snow (1986) and Rothschild’s (2011) arguments imply 
that even when banning risk classification furthers some distributional objective, imposing a ban is a 
sub-optimal way to achieve this objective.  
As such, any welfarist social planner will prefer the outcomes in some feasible regime with legal risk 
classification to the banned risk-classification market outcomes. Insofar as these sorts of taxes are 
within the purview of the social planner, then, one can conclude that bans on risk-classification are 
never strictly desirable, regardless of distributional concerns. 
6. Endogenous Informational Environments 
 
In the preceding analysis, we modeled individuals as having a fixed amount of information about their 
own risk type (specifically, full information). In many applications, the assumption of static information 
is unrealistic, as individuals may, for example, learn more information about their own risk types 
through screening tests or medical exams. With the advent and development of genetic screening, 
                                                          
21
 The argument is general. It does not rely on the MWS equilibrium concept; it applies even when risk-
classification is costly, and it does not require the social planner to know anything about the costliness or 
informativeness of the risk-classification technology. It only requires that the social planner knows the magnitude 
of the cross subsidies that obtain in the absence of risk classification. Of course, banning risk classification could 
still be preferred, on distributional grounds, to a status quo policy of legal risk classification. Rothschild’s (2011) 
argument shows that there is some social insurance policy which is Pareto preferred to such a ban, but the social 
planner may not know enough under the status-quo regime to compute this Pareto preferred policy. A lack of 
necessary information is particularly likely when the risk classification technology is rapidly changing, as with 
genetic testing; as such, this argument—and indeed, the model underlying it—should be used with extreme 
caution.  
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analyses of insurance purchases in these sorts of “dynamic” informational environments are increasingly 
important.  We show in this section that the basic conclusion that risk classification bans are typically 
associated with negative static efficiency consequences extends to standard models of these 
environments. The conclusion that risk-classification bans may involve tradeoffs between distributional 
equity and efficiency, when unaccompanied by other policy interventions, requires some nuanced 
reinterpretation, however. To see why, consider a simple setting in which individuals are initially 
uninformed but later learn about their risk type and then purchase insurance. From an interim point of 
view after individuals have learned their type but before they have purchased insurance, a ban on risk 
classification may (beneficially) redistribute from low to high risk types. But from the ex-ante point of 
view before learning their type, this “redistribution” provides insurance against classification risk and 
can be regarded as (ex-ante) efficiency enhancing. So, in dynamic settings, it may make more sense to 
think of risk-classification as imposing a tradeoff between ex-ante and interim efficiency.22 
Dynamic informational environments are more challenging to analyze because of the interaction 
between the availability of tests, testing decisions, and insurance opportunities. In particular, an 
individual’s decision to learn more about her risk type through a test will likely depend on how that 
information will affect her insurance options, and aggregated individual decisions will in turn affect the 
insurance options available.  
Dionne et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of many of these issues (see also Crocker and 
Snow (1992) and Doherty and Thistle (1996)). We build on their basic analysis here, but we modify it in 
two ways. First, we focus specifically on the implications of dynamic information for risk classification. 
Second, we employ the MWS market outcome concept instead of the Rothschild-Stiglitz concept, 
thereby resolving some non-existence problems that can arise in their analyses.  
The basic framework is a simple extension of the two-type framework discussed above. There are two 
risk types  and   and two possible informational states for individuals, “informed” and “uninformed”. 
Informed individuals know their risk type; uninformed individuals ( -types) do not. We let   denote the 
fraction of individuals who are informed;   is an endogenous quantity insofar as individuals can choose 
whether or not to become informed.  We denote by           the exogenous initial fraction of 
                                                          
22
 This is not always a precise distinction. For example, interim inefficiency means that there is a potential 
intervention that effects a Pareto improvement at the interim stage. Any such improvement would, of course, be 
desirable at the ex-ante stage as well. As such, it is not so much a true “tradeoff” between interim and ex-ante 
efficiency as it is a question of the implementation of the potential Pareto improvement at the interim stage. 
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informed individuals. The fraction of informed individuals who are -types, denoted again by  , is 
assumed independent of  . Finally, there is a fixed utility cost     for an uninformed type to take a 
test and become informed.  -types are uncertain about their true risk type and, if they remain 
uninformed, have the same preferences as an individual with risk type               .  
We first describe the MWS market outcomes in four cases, which differ in the availability of information 
to insurers (or to a notional social planner). In each of these cases, an MWS market outcome consists of 
both the contracts  ⃗   
  received by         types and the endogenous fraction   of informed 
types. We then use these to analyze the welfare consequences of banning risk classification.  
6.1 Symmetric information 
If information is completely symmetric, the market outcomes are simple: each type   (         ) 
receives a type-specific actuarially fair full insurance contract  ⃗   (viz Figure 5). Since becoming 
informed does not change the expected (actuarial) value of -types’ consumption but does introduce 
welfare reducing uncertainty—in the price of the contract received— -types have no incentive to 
become informed, and        
 
Figure 5: Market Outcomes with Private Test Results and Public Information Status 
 
6.2 Private test results, public information status  
21 
 
Figure 5 depicts the market outcome if insurance firms can observe whether an individual has been 
tested or not—and can condition their contracts on this observation—but do not observe the outcome 
of that test. In this case, -types again get their full-insurance actuarially fair contract  ⃗  . - and  - 
types get the contracts  ⃗   and  ⃗   associated with the MWS market outcome for a two risk-type 
economy. (As drawn, these involve cross subsidies; our analysis does not depend on this.)  
As in the symmetric information case, uninformed individuals again do not have an incentive to become 
informed in this market outcome: taking the test and becoming informed does not affect the expected 
value of the consumption provided by insurance, but it introduces two types of risk: classification risk, as 
in the symmetric case, and the uninsured accident risk associated with the fact that  ⃗   provides less 
than full insurance. Hence,     .
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6.3 Private information status, verifiable test outcomes 
If type and informational status are private information, but test outcomes can be verifiably reported for 
individuals who have taken the test, then  -types will reveal their type and receive full fair insurance. -
types will not reveal their test status and will be indistinguishable from   types.24 
Fixing any         , the market for the  and  types will be a standard two-type MWS outcome, 
with -types playing the role usually played by  -types. We denote by   ⃗⃗⃗⃗       the contract received by 
 -types (      . Since the ratio of - to -types is           , a higher   reduces the scope for 
utility-improving cross subsidies from the - to the -types. There is some  ̅ such that there are zero 
cross subsidies when    ̅ and positive cross subsidies when    ̅. Hence, when    ̅, 
 (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗         )  is strictly decreasing in   and when    ̅   (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗         )  is independent of        
The value of information to  -types is: 
       [ (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗         )   (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗         )]       [ (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗      )   (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗         )] (8)  
                                                          
23
 If information status is public and test results are private but verifiable,  -types will then have an incentive to 
verifiably reveal their test results and receive their full-insurance actuarially fair contract  ⃗  . Moreover, firms will 
then infer that informed types who did not reveal their risk types are  -types; they will therefore receive their full-
insurance actuarially fair contract  ⃗  . This case thus effectively reduces to the symmetric information case. 
24
 This informational regime would naturally apply where testing is, by law or custom, anonymous. Then individuals 
can credibly reveal test results but cannot credibly “reveal” that they have not been tested.    
22 
 
                 [ (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗      )   (  ⃗⃗⃗⃗         )], 
where the first equality uses the fact that individuals will not reveal the test results if they turn out to be 
 , and where the second equality follows from the binding incentive compatibility constraint in an MWS 
equilibrium.  
Figure 6 qualitatively plots      in the non-trivial     ̅ case. It is continuous on          but jumps 
up discretely at     since the market will offer no contract to (non-existent) -types there, and 
choosing to remain uninformed would force -types into contract  ⃗  .   
 
Figure 6: The Value of Information with Unobservable but Verifiable Tests 
The equilibrium values of   can be found for various testing costs  . When             , all 
individuals want to get tested no matter what other individuals do. The market outcome therefore 
involves     and involves all individuals getting tested and receiving their type-specific actuarially fair 
full insurance contracts. When       , nobody wants to get tested and the unique equilibrium has 
    . For intermediate values of   there are multiple equilibrium values of    This multiplicity arises 
from a coordination problem: as Figure 6 illustrates, the incentive to become informed increases as 
more and more individuals become informed. When    ̅        , there are two equilbria: either all 
individuals coordinate on remaining uniformed (so that     ) or they coordinate on becoming 
informed and      When            ̅ , there is, additionally, a third (unstable) equilibrium    the 
unique intermediate value satisfying       . Whenever there are multiple equilibria, they can be 
Pareto ranked, with lower   equilibria dominating higher   equilibria.  
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6.4 Purely private information 
When information is purely private, the market outcome can be found by first considering the market 
outcome for any given      and then looking for equilibrium values of      
When        , there are effectively three unobservably distinct types. Figure 7 provides a qualitative 
depiction of the MWS market outcome ( ⃗ 
 
     ⃗ 
 
     ⃗ 
 
   ). In this outcome, -types receive full 
insurance, and there are two binding incentive compatibility constraints:  
  ( ⃗ 
 
      )   ( ⃗        ) and   ( ⃗        )   ( ⃗        )  (9)  
Figure 7 depicts the case where  -types provide cross subsidies to the -types but -types don’t receive 
a cross subsidy; other configurations are possible. 
 
Figure 7: A 3-type MWS Equilibrium 
For any          the value of information      satisfies 
           [ ( ⃗ 
 
      )   ( ⃗ 
 
      )]   [ ( ⃗ 
 
      )   ( ⃗ 
 
      )] 
               [ ( ⃗ 
 
      )   ( ⃗ 
 
      )]     
(10) 
with strict inequality if and only if  ⃗ 
 
  ⃗ 
 
  The equality and inequality on the second line respectively 
follow from the binding -type incentive constraint and the combination of the  -type incentive 
constraint and the single crossing property ( -types’ indifference curves are steeper than -types’).  
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We now establish that an equilibrium always exists. If          then there is obviously an equilibrium 
with     . If          the following three facts hold: (i)      is continuous, (ii)             , and 
(iii)        for all     ̅    for some  ̅   .25 Hence, there is a          such that        which, 
together with the corresponding allocation ( ⃗ 
 
     ⃗ 
 
     ⃗ 
 
   ) constitutes an equilibrium.26 
6.5 The inefficiency of risk classification bans with endogenous information 
Risk classification is only relevant when firms potentially have access to some information which they 
can use for classification—i.e., in the informational environments of sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. Banning 
risk classification in each of these settings effectively makes information purely private, as in section 6.4. 
We now show that such a ban leads to economic inefficiencies in each of the three settings. To do so, 
we explicitly construct incentive and information compatible contract menus that could, in principle, be 
offered by a social planner with no more information than insurance firms and that would Pareto 
improve on the market outcome that obtains without risk classification.  
 
Figure 8: The Inefficiency of Banning Risk Classification with Endogenous Information 
                                                          
25
 Fact (i) follows from the continuity in   of the MWS allocations. Fact (ii) can be proved using continuity and the 
observion that the solution to the 3-type MWS program (per Spence 1978) when             has  ⃗ 
 
  ⃗ 
 
 
(the allocation corresponds with the Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation for these two types). Fact (iii) can be proved by 
observing (1) that the MWS outcome in 3-type problems with a zero measure of the intermediate  -types involves 
pooling  -types and  -types; (2) that separating  -types from  -types in this allocation strictly lowers the  -types 
utility in this solution; and (3) by continuity, the same is true when the measure of  -types is sufficiently close to 0.   
26
 Note that this is in contrast to Doherty and Thistle (1996), who use the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. The key 
difference being that the MWS equilibrium is continuous in   at     whereas the utility of the  -type jumps 
discretely at     in the RS equilibrium.   
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Suppose first that when risk classification is banned, the market outcome involves      so there are 
some uninformed individuals. A possible market outcome ( ⃗ 
 
  ⃗ 
 
  ⃗ 
 
) is depicted in Figure 8 (which 
remains deliberately agnostic about the cross-subsidies.) Figure 8 also depicts an alternative menu of 
contracts ( ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
  ). This menu is constructed in three sequential steps: 
1.     
       
     
       
    , so -types are offered slightly more generous full insurance 
coverage.  
2.  ( ⃗ 
     )   ( ⃗ 
     ) and  ( ⃗ 
     )   ( ⃗ 
 
   ), which implies: (i) -types remain 
indifferent to their new contract and the new -type contract; (ii) -types get additional 
insurance; and (iii) the additional insurance is priced at their actuarially fair rate.  
3.  ( ⃗ 
     )   ( ⃗ 
     )   ( ⃗ 
 
   )   ( ⃗ 
 
   ) and     
       
  , so that (i)  -types are now 
offered full insurance, and (ii) the benefit to a -type of becoming informed and learning that 
she is an  -type is unchanged. 
The allocation ( ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
  ) is incentive and information compatible whenever   is observable or 
verifiable. Moreover, by steps 2 and 3, the value of information to  -types is unchanged; it therefore 
remains consistent with equilibrium for the same fraction   of individuals to be informed.  
Note that  ( ⃗   
     )   ( ⃗ 
 
   )  as  ⃗   
   and  ⃗ 
 
lie on the same indifference curve and the former 
provides more insurance. Hence, the menu ( ⃗   
    ⃗   
    ⃗   
  ) earns non-negative profits. By continuity, 
( ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
  ) also earns non-negative profits for sufficiently small  , and the menu ( ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
    ⃗ 
  ) is 
therefore resource-feasible. Hence, it could in principle be implemented by a social planner no more 
informed than the market. Since it Pareto dominates the banned risk-classification market outcome 
( ⃗ 
 
  ⃗ 
 
  ⃗ 
 
), risk classification is inefficient whenever   is observable or verifiable—i.e., in the 
informational environments of sections 6.1 and 6.3.  
The inefficiency of banning risk classification when information status but not risk type is observable, as 
in section 6.2, can be established using a related argument that relies on giving - instead of  -types full 
insurance when the ban is lifted.27  
                                                          
27
 When testing status is unobservable, and it is (a) possible for individuals who have taken a test to verify having 
taken it, (b) impossible for people who have not been tested to verify it, and (c) firms cannot ever observe the 
outcome of any test, then one can construct examples where a ban on the use of test status has no negative 
efficiency consequences and beneficial distributional consequences. Specifically, If     and                  
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Suppose next that the market outcome when risk classification is banned involves      The market 
outcome will therefore be the MWS outcome ( ⃗   
   ⃗   
 ) for a two-type economy. This is inefficient 
in the informational environments of section 6.1 and 6.3, since a social planner can feasibly implement 
the contract pair ( ⃗    ⃗   
 )  where  ⃗   is the full insurance contract with    ⃗          ⃗   
     , 
(as in Figure 1), which will remain consistent with    . It is also inefficient in the informational 
environment of section 6.2, since in this case, a social planner can instead offer the menu 
( ⃗   
   ⃗    ⃗   
 ), where  ⃗   is the full insurance contract satisfying  ( ⃗     )    ( ⃗   
    )  
      ( ⃗     )  This will yield an equilibrium with      since uninformed types will strictly prefer 
 ⃗   to paying   to become informed and then face a lottery with the same expected value. This 
equilibrium thus Pareto dominates the original banned-classification equilibrium.  
We conclude that the outcomes without risk classification are inefficient in each of the three 
information environments in which risk classification could potentially be used.  
6.6 Distributional consequences of risk classification  
As in Section 5, risk classification will often have distributional as well as efficiency consequences in 
these endogenous informational environments. For example, -types may receive positive cross 
subsidies in a banned-classification pure private information market outcome like that depicted in Figure 
7. If so, banning risk classification will increase the well-being of -types relative to the symmetric 
information market outcomes  ⃗  . 
The welfare consequences of risk classification with endogenous private information are thus 
qualitatively quite similar to the consequences with fixed private information (per section 5). A ban on 
risk classification may lead to a market outcome which is preferable—on distributional grounds—to the 
market outcome which obtains when risk classification is permitted. But in principle there is a more 
efficient way to achieve these redistributive goals. Of course, as we discuss further below, whether it is 
possible in practice to achieve these goals in a more efficient way is far from clear: there is no obvious 
analog, e.g., to the partial social insurance scheme discussed in section 5.2 which allows the social 
planner to “lock in” the distributional benefits of a risk classification ban while removing it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
are both sufficiently high, then the banned-classification equilibrium will involve  -types getting full, fair insurance 
and will involve   and   types pooling at a less-than full insurance allocation. Lifting the ban does not affect  -
types but breaks the  -and-  pooling, undesirably making the former better off at the latter’s expense. Since both 
types’ feasible allocations remain constrained by the same  -type incentive compatibility constraint, however, 
“undoing” this redistribution and strictly improving on the original pooling allocation is impossible.  
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6.7 Robustness to other types of testing  
The preceding analysis focused on a situation in which (a) there are no intrinsic benefits of testing and 
(b) testing is perfect. The basic conclusion that banning classification has efficiency consequences is 
robust to relaxing both assumptions.  
The private benefits of testing in the preceding analysis, if any, arise from the informational 
asymmetries and the associated sorting of individuals into insurance contracts. In practice, of course, 
testing may also have direct benefits, for example by facilitating better treatments. A simple way of 
incorporating this sort of benefit is to allow the cost of testing   to be negative. While this can change 
the market outcomes discussed in sections 6.1 and 6.2 (since individuals could now choose to get 
tested), it does not substantively affect the economic analysis of risk classification in these 
environments. Hoel et al. (2006) reach a similar conclusion in a model with heterogeneity in the benefits 
of testing.28  
Browne and Kamiya (2012) study the demand for underwriting. Specifically,  they analyze a model of 
costly and potentially imperfect underwriting in a two-type market where all individuals are perfectly 
and, initially, privately informed about their type. By going through an underwriting process,  -types can 
signal their type to insurers and thereby improve their coverage. ( -types may also demand 
underwriting if the test is sufficiently imperfect that they find it worth bearing the underwriting cost for 
the chance at being incorrectly classified as a low risk.) Banning underwriting is generally inefficient in 
this context as well, by the basic argument in Rothschild (2011).  
7. Endogenous Risk Classification  
 
Endogenous risk classification refers to risk classification based on the choices made by the insured 
individuals rather than their intrinsic characteristics. These choices may affect individual’s riskiness (and 
hence may be related to moral hazard) as in Bond and Crocker (1991) or they may simply signal 
riskiness, as in Polborn (2008).  
In Bond and Crocker (1991), preferences are given by 
                                                          
28
 Also see Doherty and Posey (1998) and Hoel and Iversen (2000) who build on Hoy’s (1989) model of self-
protection to study the consequences of genetic testing in a market with asymmetric information. 
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             (   
    )       
           
       (11) 
where   is an endogenous choice that has a direct effect on individual well-being via the strictly concave 
and increasing function      and an indirect effect through the accident probabilities      . The 
function      could, for example, represent the “enjoyment” of smoking cigarettes. The parameter    
captures the  -type’s intrinsic taste for  , which is assumed to have unit cost  . The accident risks 
      for the two types       potentially differ for two reasons. First, it may be that             
for any given  , so that -types are intrinsically riskier. Second, the -type may have a stronger 
preference for the risky activity       and may therefore choose a larger  . For expositional 
simplicity, we focus here on the second effect by taking                  so that individuals differ 
only in their taste for   not in their intrinsic riskiness. If   represents cigarette smoking, this amounts to 
assuming that the health risks associated with a given level of cigarette smoking are independent of how 
much an individual intrinsically enjoys  smoking.  
“Endogenous risk classification” in this context involves pricing policies based on the observable decision 
 . It is straightforward to show that endogenous risk classification implies a first-best efficient market 
outcome (when             . To wit: a first best allocation maximizes    (  
    
    ) subject to a 
resource constraint  
 
[               (      )      ]  [      
            
 ]     (12) 
which can equivalently be interpreted as a “break-even” or zero-profit constraint for  insurers. The first 
order necessary conditions require first that    
    
       i.e., full insurance given  , and, second, 
that   is chosen so that the iso-resource set (a constant left-hand-side of (12)) and the  -type’s 
indifference set are tangent in          -space.   
Figure 9 plots the tangency conditions for      , making use of the full insurance property to reduce 
the dimensionality and plot in        space. Because we assume            , the zero-profit line is 
the same for both types. (It is non-linear because      depends on  .) The first-best allocation occurs at 
the tangency points of the indifference curves (labeled     and    ). Because        the tangency 
points           and           satisfy        . It is clear from Figure 9 that this allocation is 
incentive compatible. It is therefore the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rothschild-Stiglitz style game 
where profit-maximizing firms simultaneously offer contracts and individuals then choose contracts. This 
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means that endogenous classification—here captured by the fact that firms are offering different 
contracts to individuals who make different choices of  —leads to a first-best efficient outcome.  
 
Figure 9: First-Best Break-Even Allocations with Endogenous Risk Classification 
If classification is banned, so that contracts are not allowed to condition on  , on the other hand, no 
first-best allocation is feasible. Intuitively, a ban on  -based classification introduces an inefficiency 
causing moral hazard problem: individuals do not take the effects of   on      into account when they 
are fully insured and their contract is independent of  .29 
The preceding argument for the inefficiency of banning endogenous risk classification in Bond and 
Crocker’s (1991) environment is clearly robust to small differences between       and      , which 
would appear in Figure 9 as vertical differences between the break-even constraints of the two types. 
The argument depends critically, however, on firms having significant flexibility in designing their 
insurance products—in particular, in their ability to offer contracts whose payouts depend on the choice 
  (or simply the ability to dictate  ).  
Polborn (2008) studies a loosely related model of endogenous risk classification without this flexibility: 
his model has a fixed contract and mandated purchases. Endogenous risk classification arises because 
risk type is correlated with preferences for something observable, such as car color. In this context, the 
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 Formally: the first order conditions for a first-best   is                         . The utility an individual 
gets from choosing   and a full insurance contract at a premium   is  ̂                     the 
derivative of which is                   . Since          , individuals find a marginal increase in   
desirable at any first best optimum allocation. 
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use of risk classification—pricing based on endogenously chosen observables—can cause inefficiencies. 
Intuitively, this is because observable-based competitive pricing leads to lower prices for the 
observables chosen by individuals with low risk. Individuals’ choices in equilibrium are thus inefficiently 
distorted towards those observables that are intrinsically preferred by these low-risk individuals.  
The contrast between the efficiency properties of risk classification in Bond and Crocker’s and Polborn’s 
models of endogenous risk classification thus mirror the contrast between the efficiency properties of 
risk classification in Section 3 and Section 5: when firms and consumers have more “flexibility” to 
respond to restrictions on risk classification, there will typically be more inefficiency. Intuitively: 
inefficiencies are caused by the attempt to avoid or “work around” restrictions on risk classification.  
8. New Directions  
 
Our analysis of the economic consequences of risk classification has focused on the class of relatively 
simple models discussed most extensively in the literature, namely those with: (1) a small number of 
types (and signals); (2) adverse selection but no (or only a limited form of) moral hazard; (3) static rather 
than dynamic contracting; (4) exclusive contracting and non-linear pricing; and (5) a single risk. In this 
section, we briefly discuss the less developed literatures which relax these assumptions.  
8.1 Models with richer type spaces 
Two-type settings have the advantage of facilitating tractable, graphical analyses. The qualitative 
insights from two-type models often generalize; but not always. Within the two-type symmetric 
information framework discussed above, for example, bans on risk classification can have negative 
efficiency consequences in both the “fixed-full contracts”  case (where firms compete on the price of 
full-insurance contracts) and the “screening” case (where firms compete on both price and coverage 
levels). But the inefficiencies in these two cases are qualitatively distinct: With fixed contracts, 
inefficiencies arise when pooled pricing causes market unraveling and low-risk types exit the market 
entirely. With screening, the low-risk type remains insured but is inefficiently quantity-rationed. Recent 
work by Hendren (2013) shows that this qualitative distinction is not general. In particular, his “No 
Trade” theorem shows that unraveling can occur even when firms can employ screening mechanisms.   
   
31 
 
Specifically, Hendren extends the canonical one-risk insurance market framework described above to 
allow for an arbitrary distribution      of types differing in their risk         of experiencing a loss. He 
shows that an insurance market will completely unravel—there will be No Trade—unless there is some 
risk type    who is willing to pay the average cost of insurance for the pool of all higher risk types in 
order to obtain a small quantity of insurance. Figure 10 illustrates a situation in which the No-Trade 
condition is violated. To wit: the slope of the   -type’s indifference curve at the endowment point is 
lower than the slope of the zero-profit curve for the pooled above-   risk types, namely                       
       |   
        |   
   , where    is the expectation-with-respect-to-measure-  operator, . 
So the    type does value insurance enough to buy it even when it is priced fairly for the pooled set of 
risk types above   . When there is no such type, however,30 the only resource feasible, incentive 
compatible, and individually rational allocation is the autarkic allocation with no insurance at all.  
 
Figure 10: Hendren's "No-Trade" Condition is Violated at    
Hendren’s No-Trade theorem has important implications for understanding the consequences of risk 
classification. First, it directly implies that eliminating risk classification in a symmetric information world 
in which the No-Trade condition is satisfied will lead to complete market unraveling—and this is true 
regardless of whether firms can, in principle, employ screening mechanisms.31  
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 For example, when           ,      is uniform on [0,1], and   
 
 
. 
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 In fact, as Hendren (2014) shows, the No-Trade theorem implies that the very structure of the two-type 
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium is not robust: if the type distribution   has full support near    , then the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium exists only if it involves no insurance for any type.  As such, its prediction that some 
32 
 
The No-Trade theorem also has important implications for understanding the consequences of banning 
partially informative risk classification. Consider a market with a full type support         and suppose 
that there is a signal         that is correlated with risk. Assume, in particular, that   is the riskier 
category, in the sense that      |   
        |   
   for all   . Then there are four possibilities. 
(1) If the No-Trade condition holds within the   category, then it will, a fortiori, also hold for the 
population as a whole and within the  -category. A ban on risk classification is then irrelevant: there will 
be no trade both with and without a ban. (2) If the No-Trade condition is violated within the   category 
but is satisfied for the pooled population, then there will be no market for insurance under a ban on risk 
classification, while removing the permitting risk classification can32 lead to welfare-improving insurance 
provision—although only within category  .  (3a) If the No-Trade condition is violated within the pooled 
population but not within category- , then trade can take place under a ban on risk classification and 
removing the ban can eliminate category-  individuals’ access to insurance. (3b) If the No-Trade 
condition is violated within category  , then (different) trade can take place with and without a ban.  
This typology is qualitatively similar to the typology of section 5.1 with “the No-Trade condition is 
violated” here replacing “scope for Pareto improving cross subsidies” in section 5.1. A similar efficiency-
distribution tradeoff typology applies as well: in case (1), bans on risk-classification are irrelevant. In case 
(2), bans on risk-classification have purely negative efficiency consequences without any beneficial 
redistribution. In cases (3a) and (3b) there are (at least potentially) distributional consequences of a ban, 
with the worse-off category   individuals benefiting from a ban at the expense of the better off 
category   individuals. The big difference from case (3) in section 5.1 is that in case (3a) here, permitting 
risk classification doesn’t just make the  -category types worse off, but in fact completely eliminates 
their access to insurance.33 
Perhaps less obviously, there are also generically negative efficiency consequences of a risk-classification 
ban in cases (3a) and (3b)—at least under the MWS market equilibrium concept. To see this, suppose 
that in the presence of a ban the market implements some constrained efficient allocation that involves 
some implicit per-capita cross-subsidies from the-risk category   to the high-risk category   individuals. 
Let    denote the expected value of profits in category   (so        ) and let  ̅    denote the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
types will be fully insured and other types will be partially insured holds only when the risk is essentially bounded 
away from    . This is among the reasons we focus on the MWS equilibrium concept here. 
32
 There is scope for trade in the   category, and there is always a non-trivial MWS equilibrium with trade when 
the No Trade condition is violated (viz Hendren, 2014, footnote 11).  
33
 Hendren (2014) provides compelling evidence that firms do use risk classification to exclude individuals from 
insurance purchases, and do so precisely among classes where the No-Trade condition is most likely to be satisfied.  
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expected utility of the  -type in this allocation. Then consider the (mathematical) problem of maximizing 
for each         the average expected utility (e.g.) of the category-  individuals subject to incentive 
compatibility, a resource constraint that the per-capita profits are no more than   , and a set of 
minimum utility constraints       ̅   . These problems are feasible since the original banned-
classification equilibrium satisfies these constraints. The minimum utility constraints ensure that no 
individual is worse off in their solutions than in the banned categorization equilibrium. Since there is 
increased scope for Pareto improving cross-subsidies within the lower-risk category  , however, the 
solution to the category-  problem will in general Pareto dominate the banned-classification 
equilibrium. In other words, as in case (3) in section 5.1, the banned-classification equilibrium will be 
constrained inefficient.  
In cases (3a) and (3b), bans on risk classification thus involve tradeoffs between efficiency and 
distributional goals. As in the endogenous information environments discussed in section 6.5, the case 
for focusing exclusively on the inefficiencies is significantly less compelling in this setting than in section 
5.2: there is theoretical scope for Pareto improving on a banned-classification equilibrium in this case, 
but it is not obvious that there is also a practical way of implementing these improvements.  
8.2 Moral hazard extensions 
Bond and Crocker’s (1991) endogenous risk classification model becomes a “private action” moral 
hazard setting when endogenous risk classification is banned, but it is not, at its core, about risk-
classification with moral hazard, since risk-classification in their setting is equivalent to eliminating the 
moral hazard problem. An interesting and important direction for future work would be to explore the 
consequences of restricting classification based on observable correlates of propensities towards 
unobservable but risk-relevant actions. This is a challenging problem, as screening models with both 
adverse selection and moral hazard are notoriously difficult to solve—since, as discussed in Arnott 
(1992), Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997), and Stiglitz and Yun (2013), the introduction of moral hazard 
typically leads to single-crossing violations.  
One potentially promising route around these technical challenges is to abstract from “screening” 
considerations. Einav et al. (2013), for example, study and empirically estimate a model with two types 
of selection: traditional adverse selection based on risk, and “selection on moral hazard,” whereby 
privately known heterogeneity in the responsiveness of treatment intensity to coverage leads to 
different preferences over an exogenously fixed set of contracts.  
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8.3 Dynamic extensions 
The preceding analysis is relevant to—but unsuitable for a complete analysis of—risk classification based 
on new information that arises over time as individuals (and/or firms) learn more about their riskiness. 
If, for example, health insurance contracts are negotiated annually and firms can use pre-existing 
conditions to classify risks, then developing an expensive-to-treat, chronic condition in one year will 
raise an individual’s premiums or limit her access to insurance in future years. From an ex-ante 
perspective, then, permitting risk classification based on pre-existing conditions in future years exposes 
individuals to significant welfare-reducing reclassification risk. A static model is obviously insufficient for 
fully analyzing this dynamic phenomenon; nevertheless, in any given future period, the conclusion from 
static models that restricting risk classification can have efficiency costs still applies. Risk-classification in 
dynamic settings can thus involve tradeoffs between ex-ante efficient provision of insurance against re-
classification risk and interim efficient insurance provision.   
Various types of dynamic contracts have been suggested in the literature as ways to ease these 
tradeoffs. Long-term contracts with full two-sided commitment can typically provide full insurance 
against both types of risk, but the literature has focused on the more realistic case with limited 
commitment on the insurance buyer’s side. Tabarrok (1994) suggests developing markets for insuring 
the re-classification risk (specifically, the risk arising from genetic tests) directly. Pauly et al. (1995) 
suggest guaranteed renewable contracts and show that these can be used to fully insure reclassification 
risk in symmetric information environments.34 Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) show,35 however, that simple 
guaranteed renewable contracts are not optimal for individuals who face capital market imperfections: 
optimal contracting involves tradeoffs between classification risk insurance and consumption smoothing 
motives. Since classification risk is not fully eliminated by the private market, interventions that limit 
risk-classification are potentially efficient. 
Polborn et al. (2006) identify a similar tradeoff in a dynamic model of life insurance. In their model, 
individuals learn over time about both their risk type and their life insurance needs. Uncertainty about 
life insurance needs militates for delaying the purchase of life insurance, but these delays expose 
individuals to classification risk—and, again, restrictions on risk classification may improve welfare.  
                                                          
34
 Pauly et al. (2011) show that guaranteed renewability can still provide full insurance against reclassification risk 
even with substantial informational asymmetries  
35
 This builds on a long line of literature on dynamic contracting with limited commitment, including Dionne and 
Doherty (1994).  
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8.4 Non-exclusive contracting, linear pricing, and multi-state models 
We have so far focused on exclusive contracting models. Some markets, notably those for life insurance 
and life annuities, are non-exclusive: individuals can, and do, purchase simultaneous policies from 
multiple insurers. The literature typically assumes linear pricing when modeling these environments.36 
Hoy (2006) discusses the effect of banning risk classification in a two-type asymmetric information 
model with a single risk and with non-exclusivity-cum-linear pricing. His analysis indicates that the 
welfare impacts of such bans are qualitatively similar to those in the analogous exclusive contracting 
framework: there are negative efficiency consequences of these bans, but they can also have 
distributional effects that lead to an increase in (e.g.) utilitarian social welfare.  
We have also focused on models with a single insurable risk; this is consistent with the literature and 
reflects the fact that single-risk models are analytically simpler and typically yield qualitative predictions 
similar to many-risk models. In non-exclusive contracting environments with linear pricing, however, 
distinguishing between single-risk and many-risks is qualitatively important. As Brunner and Pech (2005) 
and Rothschild (2014) point out—both in the annuity market context—linear pricing in a single risk 
model implies pooling, since all types purchase the same contract. When there are multiple payout 
states (future payment periods in the annuity context), separation via different across-state payment 
patterns is possible—and, indeed, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) provide evidence of exactly this 
sort of risk-based separation. The implications of restrictions on risk-based classification with linear 
pricing and contract-shape-based screening have not yet been studied comprehensively. 
9. Conclusions 
 
We have analyzed the consequences of restrictions on risk classification in a broad range of canonical 
insurance market models. Such restrictions have potentially desirable distributional consequences; 
indeed, that is a major motivation for imposing such restrictions. We argued that such restrictions 
typically also have negative efficiency consequences in market-based settings that are otherwise 
unregulated. These negative efficiency consequences mean that, in principle, there is some method for 
achieving the distributional benefits of such restrictions at a lower cost without imposing such 
restrictions. Insofar as it is possible in practice to obtain these distributional benefits in lower-cost 
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 Viz Abel (1986), Villeneuve (2003), Hoy and Polborn (2000), and Polborn et al. (2006). 
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ways—as in the settings discussed in section 5.2—these negative efficiency consequences argue strongly 
against restricting the use of risk-classification in otherwise market-based settings. There are, of course, 
alternative interpretations of this result: one can interpret it as an explicit “pro-market” argument 
against bans on risk classification, or, alternatively as a “pro-interventionist” argument for the 
implementation of alternatives or complements to bans on risk classification.  
In other, and perhaps most, settings (viz Sections 6.6 and 8.1), there is no clear practical alternative to 
risk classification bans, for obtaining its (potential) distributional benefits at lower efficiency costs. In 
such settings, alternative methods for evaluating its efficiency and equity consequences are necessary. 
As such, the practical feasibility, and, indeed, the practical design of these alternative ways of achieving 
the distributional benefits of categorical pricing restrictions should be a significant component of any 
practical evaluation of risk-classification policies. Our hope is that laying out the economic consequences 
of risk classification in a reasonably comprehensive set of environments, as we have done in this article, 
will facilitate such evaluations in the future.37 
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